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INTRODUCTION

The United States has recently seen increasing efforts to harmonize' its law of patents with those of foreign countries. Extensive intellectual-property provisions exist, for example, in the
North American Free Trade Agreement. 2 The Uruguay-Round negotiations concerning the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") have, for the first time, produced a comprehensive set of
intellectual-property provisions in the context of that agreement,
albeit in draft form. 3 Discussions of the merits of harmonization
4
are appearing frequently in legal literature.
1. Generally speaking, the harmonization of legal systems refers to coordi-

nating the various rules of law in the subject systems to the point where they
express common, minimum principles. In this sense, harmonization can be contrasted with the more exacting ideal of "unification" of the law which, in its
pristine form, refers to the use of the same legal rules in each system. See
generally 2 DAVID RENE, THE INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 5, 34-35 (1971).
2. PAUL HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 83-89 (1993). If adopted, the North

American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") would create a free-trade zone
comprising the United States, Mexico, and Canada. All three governments
have signed the agreement, but it has yet to be ratified.
The intellectual property provisions of NAFTA have been reprinted in 5
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 284 (1992). For an analysis of these provisions, see
Seth D. Greenstein, Examination of I.P. Provisions of North American Free
Trade Agreement, 6 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 344 (1992).
3. In part, due to the insistence of United States negotiators, the member
nations of GATT have resolved to negotiate substantive intellectual-property
provisions for inclusion into that agreement during the Uruguay Round. See

generally DONALD K. DUVALL, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC 553-68
(1992). The present text of GATT treats intellectual property matters only peripherally. Id. at 555.

The Director-General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, has produced a draft
agreement in an effort to conclude the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Draft
FinalAct for UruguayRound, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNC/w/Fa (Dec. 20, 1991).
See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Split Regarding the Protection of Intellectual PropertyRights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 108-11 (1993). The intellectual-property provisions of that agreement have been reprinted at 5 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 42 (1992). They have been the subject of considerable con-

troversy. See, e.g., Mid-April Deadline Set for Talks; TRIPs Document Gets
Poor Reviews, 6 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 41 (1992); Proposed TRIPs Text
Would Limit Use of Special 301, USTR Counsel Says, 6 WORLD INTELL. PROP.
REP. 102 (1992).
For general discussions of the intellectual property negotiations of the Uruguay Round, which are referred to by the acronym TRIPs, see generally John
Richards, Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues (TRIPS), 72 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 906 (1990); Otto A. Stamm, GATT Negotiationsfor the
Protection of New Technologies, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 680
(1991); Symposium, Trade Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 223, 689 (pts. 1 & 2) (1989); GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 11 IIC STUDIES
(Frederick Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds. 1991).

4. E.g., Blake R. Wiggs, Canada'sFirst-to-File Experience - Should the
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 493 (1991); Lisa M.
Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and

U.S. Make the Move?, 73 J.
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As a part of these efforts, the United States is now poised to
decide whether to accept the Patent Harmonization Treaty. 5 Negotiations concerning the treaty have taken place before the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") 6 since 1983. 7 A draft
text has been produced.8 The Paris Union has discussed the draft at
Patent Harmonization,72 J.P.T.O.S. 523 (1990); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-toFile: Is American Adoption of the InternationalStandard Worth the Price?,
1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 543 (1988); Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779 (1991).
5. See generally History of the Preparationsof the Patent Law Treaty,
WIPO Doc. PLT/DC/5 (Dec. 21, 1990) [hereinafter History], reprinted in
Records of the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the ParisConvention as Far as Patents are Concerned, WIPO, Diplomatic Conference, pt. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Records]. For discussions of the
Patent Harmonization Treaty overall, see Edward G. Fiorito, Harmonizationof
US. and Worldwide Patent Laws, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 83
(1991); Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO PatentHarmonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA
Q.J. 1 (1991)); William Fryer III, PatentLaw Harmonization:The Current Situation and Alternatives Available, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 242, 298
(pts. 1 & 2) (1990).
The treaty is known officially as the "Patent Law Treaty." See, e.g., History, supra. Those in the United States, however, have referred to it most commonly as the "Patent Harmonization Treaty." This article adopts the latter
useage.
6. Generally speaking, WIPO is the organization that administers the various forms of the Convention for the International Protection of Industrial
Property ("Paris Convention") and agreements subsidiary thereto. See INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

(Marshall A. Leaffer, ed.

1990). It is the creation of the countries that have adhered to the Paris Convention, who together comprise the Paris Union. WIPO replaced the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property ("BIRPI") in 1967.
Id. at 563-64; see also The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,WIPO Pub. No. 251, reprintedin Leaffer, supra at 566.
7. The treaty has been negotiated in a series of sessions before WIPO of
the "Committee of Experts on the Harmonization of Certain Provisions of Law
for the Protection of Inventions." See generally History,supra note 5, at 4. In
general, eleven preparatory sessions have been held, including an initial meeting limited to the consideration of issues relating to the use of a "grace period"
before filing. See infra notes 30-36. The following is a list of those sessions
along with citations to the Notes summarizing each that have appeared in
WIPO's monthly publication, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY:
Prior meeting on grace period
1984 INDUS. PROP. 313
1st Session
1985 INDUS. PROP. 267
2nd Session
1986 INDUS. PROP. 309
3rd Session
1987 INDUS. PROP. 204
4th Session
1988 INDUS. PROP. 179
5th Session,
part 1
1988 INDUS. PROP. 358
part 2
1989 INDUS. PROP. 53
6th Session
1989 INDUS. PROP. 269
7th Session
8th Session,
part 1
part 2

1990 INDUS. PROP. 140
1990 INDUS. PROP. 297
1991 INDUS. PROP. 41

8. Draft Treaty Supplementing the ParisConvention for the Protection of
Industrial Property As Far As Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Treaty),
WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3 (Dec. 21, 1990) [hereinafter PLT], reprinted in
Records, supra note 5, at 11-53. WIPO has suggested various modifications to
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the first part of a diplomatic conference, 9 with the second and probably final part of the conference likely to take place soon. 10 Legislation has been introduced nationally that would, in effect, commit
the United States to implement a signed treaty.1
Much of this activity has come at the insistence of patent-owning industry. 12 United States industry is relying increasingly on
foreign sales.' 3 It has attributed lost profits on those sales to inadequate patent protection in foreign countries. 14 Patent harmonization is seen as a means of strengthening the patent protection that
this proposal. They are summarized in Observations of the InternationalBureau Following the FirstPart (1991) of the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doe.
No. PLT/DC/69 (Jan. 29, 1993). See also Memorandum of the DirectorGeneral:
Continuationof the Diplomatic Conferencefor the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the ParisConvention as Faras PatentsAre Concerned, WIPO Doc.
No. P/A/XIX/3 (1992) [hereinafter Memorandum of the DirectorGeneral];Report Adopted by the Assembly, WIPO Doc. No. P/A/XIX/4 (1992).
9. The first part of the diplomatic conference occurred in June 1991.
Those proceedings are summarized in 1991 INDUS. PROP.360. See also Results of
The First Part (1991) of the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO 2d pt., Doc. No.
PLT/DC/INF/5 (Jan. 29, 1993). See discussion irqfra notes 52-67.
10. See infra notes 64-67.
11. S.2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); See also 138 CONG. REC. S5226-01 (introducing S. 2605); 44 PTCJ 3 (May
7, 1992) (summarizing testimony at the joint hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978).
Both bills failed to become legislation. As of this writing, however, the bills are
expected to be reintroduced before the second part of the diplomatic conference. See infra note 67.
12. Joint Hearings on S.2605 and HR. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary,102d Cong., 2d Sess. (statement of Robert Armitage on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers) (Apr. 30, 1992);
Position Statement by Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. on S. 2605 and H.R.
4978, The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, June 25, 1992. See also First-to-file
Does Not Win Approval by ABA House of Delegates, but Is Approved at National Association of Manufacturers meeting, 45 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 323-24 (Feb. 18, 1993). The various advisory committees that assisted
the United States in formulating its policies toward trade negotiations in the
1980's included heavy representation from industry. See infra notes 188-89.
13. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representation, Administration Statement on International Trade Policy 2 (Sept. 23, 1985) (reporting
growth of imports and exports, as percentage of total GNP, from 9% in 1950, to
13% in 1970, to 21% in 1985).
14. E.g., U.S.I.T.C., Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and
the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2065, 4-1 (Feb. 1988)
[hereinafter U.S.I.T.C. Survey]; Beier & Schricker, supra note 3 (assertion by
joint group of United States, Japanese, and European business entities). See
generally U.S.I.T.C. Survey, at 4-3 (calculating losses for all forms of intellectual property, based on survey results, at $23 billion); Statement of Secretary of
Commerce Malcolm Baldridge on the Proposed "Intellectual Property Rights
Improvement Act of 1986," reprinted in United States Dept. of Commerce
News (Apr. 7, 1986) (reporting losses as "from $8 billion to $20 billion in sales");
Task Force on Intellectual Property, Summary of the Phase I Recommendations to the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations 2 (Oct. 1985) [hereinafter Phase I Recommendations].
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foreign countries provide. 15
The interests of the United States as a whole, however, are not
necessarily those of its patent-owning industries. Certainly, the nation does have a clear interest in preserving the health of its industry. At the same time, it is also interested in preserving the overall
balance between incentive and cost that the patent system represents. 16 In fact, where the two conflict, reason suggests this latter,
broader set of interests should outweigh the narrower interests of
industry.
This conflict raises a troubling problem in deciding whether to
accept the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Simply put, industry's enthusiasm for the treaty may not be enough. If industry's interests
can differ from those of the United States, industry may well favor
a particular international patenting agreement that is nevertheless
harmful to the country as a whole. Consequently, relying on industry's advice to adopt such a treaty would be unwise.
The history of the negotiations over the Patent Harmonization
Treaty makes this problem particularly vexing. The treaty has
been negotiated by a small number of people outside the United
States. 17 Most attending on behalf of the United States have been
closely associated with industry.18 Few others in the United States
have followed the negotiations in detail, even among the patent
15. See, e.g., Phase I Recommendations, supra note 14, at 2-3; Statement on
International Trade Policy, supra note 13, at 12; Statement on Intellectual
Property Rights, supra note 14, at 4-5.
16. For general discussions of balancing costs and benefits in patenting, see
FRITZE MALCHUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, PATENT
STUDY No. 15 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT OF
THE COMMIrEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SEN., 86th Cong., 2d

Sess. 21-24 (1958); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM 19 (1989).
17. The negotiations have occurred in Geneva. An exact listing of the persons who have appeared at the WIPO negotiations appears in the various Notes,
published in INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, that summarize each meeting. Only fiftyfive persons have attended any of the WIPO negotiations as representatives of
United States' interests. In addition, their attendance has been highly sporadic.
Only seven persons have attended the negotiations regularly. For a more complete analysis of the attendance of U.S. experts at the WIPO negotiations, see R.
Carl Moy, Essay: Patent Harmonization,Protectionism,and Legislation, 74 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 777, 793-803 (1992).
18. Of the United States experts at the WIPO negotiations who were not
employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), nearly
all were either employees of large corporations or members of large law firms.
See generally Moy, supra note 17, at 800-01. This is due in part to the PTO's
apparent decision not to include private individuals in the United States' official
delegations to the negotiations. Id. at n.87. Although a number of PTO employees have attended, there is reason to question whether, with regard to the
WIPO negotiations, they represent an independent viewpoint. Id. at 800-01. Cf.
PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES

(1981) (discussing concept of agency "capture" by special-interest groups).
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bar.' 9 For these reasons, decisionmakers in the United States have
comparatively little information with which to analyze the Patent
Harmonization Treaty.
How, then, shall the United States decide whether to adopt the
Patent Harmonization Treaty? What questions shall we ask?
Whose answers shall we trust? What sources of information can
provide us with the background needed for these inquiries?
The following article offers a framework in which to ask, and
begin to answer, these questions. It focuses on the international
community's past efforts to harmonize the law of patents. It asserts
not only that history provides context, but also, that the same history yields lessons directly applicable to many of the treaty's basic
issues.
Section I discusses the immediate history of WIPO's efforts to
obtain the Patent Harmonization Treaty and summarizes the steps
that have been taken to date before that organization. In addition,
it also states the current procedural posture of the treaty
negotiations.
Section II places this immediate history in larger context. The
international community has been grappling with the problems of
foreign patenting for over a century. 20 Many of those problems predate the first international patenting agreement, the Paris Convention.2 ' The article summarizes those problems.
In addition, this section describes the approach to international
patenting embodied in the convention and the difficulties that the
international community has encountered in using that approach.
Section II suggests that an economic analysis explains the events
under consideration. In contrast to a purely domestic scenario, international activity permits greater freedom to select the costs and
benefits that an individual national economy will receive from patenting. The behavior of national governments is consistent with a
desire simultaneously to receive large national benefits and to incur
small costs. In contrast, the behavior of international, patent-own19. See Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AIPLA BULL., at 442-43 (noting lack of input
to the PTO from other sources prior to the diplomatic conference).
20. The international community had begun to address patenting issues at
least as early as the middle decades of the 1800's. See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS,
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS - NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 59-68 (1975); EDITH T. PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNA-

TIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 42-59 (1951); Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Re.

evaluationof the InternationalPatent Convention, 12 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
765 (1948).
21. The Paris Convention came into being in 1883. See generally Arpad
Bogsch, The FirstHundred Years of the ParisConvention for the Protectionof
Industrial Property, 1983 INDUS. PROP. 187; Frederick Beier, One Hundred
Years of InternationalCooperation - the Role of the Paris Convention in the
Past Present, and Future, 15 IIC 1 (1984).
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ing industry is consistent with a predominant desire to obtain benefits and a relative insensitivity to cost. Many of the historical
divisions between international industry and national government
continue to exist today. Consequently, they are present in the negotiations over the Patent Harmonization Treaty.
Section III outlines a set of inquiries to evaluate the Patent
Harmonization Treaty. Fundamentally, we must discern the national interests of the United States and how the treaty will affect
them. Given industry's large role in designing the treaty, coupled
with its historical disinterest in the costs of patenting, particular
attention must be placed on the increased domestic costs that the
Patent Harmonization Treaty will impose on the United States.
In addition, Section III provides a means of intelligently weighing industry's enthusiasm for the treaty. Where industry's interests
coincide with those of the nation, industry's view of the treaty is
entitled to significant weight. In contrast, where industry's support
for the treaty is colored by that groups's disinclination to consider
cost, industry's advice must be regarded skeptically. Finally, Section III suggests new ways to judge the law-making adequacy of the
negotiations over the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Given the differing views of the various domestic constitituencies that patenting
affects, issues of representation become critical.
I.

THE PATENT HARMONIZATION TREATY

A.

ProceduralHistory

The immediate history of the Patent Harmonization Treaty is
related to two developments that occurred in the late 1970's. During that period, the European Patent Office ("EPO"), the Japanese
Patent Office ("JPO"), and the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") began exploring ways to coordinate their operations.2 2 In addition, during the late 1970's the patent systems of
many western European countries underwent fundamental change.
22. See Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
1983, at 14; Michael Kirk, WIPO's Involvement in InternationalDevelopments,
50 ALB. L. REV. 601, 602 (1986). Two influences appear to have driven these
activities. First, the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") entered into force on
January 24, 1978. E.g., Leaffer, supra note 6, at 76. Chapter I of that treaty sets
out the procedures for filing an application for patent in relatively high detail.
Id. at 76, 79-105. Thus, the opportunities for cooperation between national patent offices increased.
At the same time, inventors were seeking patent protection in foreign
countries with increasing frequency. Because of the requirements of the Paris
Convention, many of these new, foreign-origin applications were largely duplicative of one another. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 119 Paris Convention, art. 4(D)(3),
reprinted in Leaffer, supra note 6, at 22 (allowing the receiving country to require the foreign applicant to produce a copy of the priority application). Generally speaking, one goal of the national offices was to eliminate the duplicative
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The member countries of the European Community had already
committed themselves to harmonizing their national patent laws,
first via the Strassbourg Convention of 1963,23 and again in 1973 via
the European Patent Convention ("EPC"). 24 For some countries,
these agreements committed the signors to make numerous, basic
changes in how they approached patenting. 25 By the late 1970's,
these changes were on the verge of becoming reality.
One such harmonization-driven change was Germany's removal of a grace period 26 from its patent laws. Prior to harmonization, the German patent system contained a grace period for certain
types of pre-filing disclosures. 27 The substantive provisions of the
Strassbourg Convention and the EPC, however, did not contain a
administrative work that occurred in handling essentially duplicate patent
filings.
23. Strassbourg Convention of 1963, reprintedin GERALD PATERSON, THE
EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 701 (1992) (requiring the adoption of similar rules of
substantive patent law).
24. European Patent Convention, reprintedin Leaffer, supra note 6, at 143
(creating a single examination proceeding to obtain national patents in member
countries).
25. The Strassbourg Convention defines the substantive law of patents in
relatively complete detail. One author asserts that its creation was driven by
the desire of members of the European Community to preclude the use of national patent laws as barriers to trade. PATERSON, supra note 23, at 16 (1992)
(noting that, prior to the formation of the Strassbourg Convention, "the existence of separate national patents for the same invention was seen as a mecha-

nism whereby trade barriers could be maintained, contrary to the newly
emerging European interest in a common market...").
The EPC took effect on October 7, 1977. Leaffer, supra note 6, at 141.
Driven by that event, a number of European countries passed patent statutes
with substantial new provisions. E.g., Law No. 78-742 of July 13, 1978, translation as amended reprintedin 3 WIPO, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, France, 2-001 (1993) (moving from registration system to an examination
system); Patents Act 1977, reprintedin 3 WIPO, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS
AND TREATIES, United Kingdom, 2-001 (1993). Professor Ullrich, for example,
asserts that France had no obviousness standard for patents until that time.
Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 133 n.11. For a discussion of the changes in
British patent law, see CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF PATENT AGENTS, C.I.P.A.
GUIDE TO THE PATENTS AcTS (1990).

26. Generally speaking, the term "grace period" refers to the time interval
prior to filing for patent during which a patent system will excuse various public disclosures and/or commercialization of the invention. See generally Grace
Period for Public Disclosure of an Invention Before Filing an Application,
WIPO Doc. No. GP/CE/I/2 Rev. (1984) (general study), reprinted in 1984 INDUS. PROP. 314. The time period in the United States is currently one year, 35
U.S.C. § 102(b), although it has varied during history. E.g., Patent Act of 1839,
ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (providing two-year grace period); Patent Act of Aug.
5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (providing current grace period of one year).
As an alternative, a national patent system may refuse to excuse any such
activities prior to filing. E.g., Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
Patent systems incorporating this latter standard are said to operate under the
principle of "absolute novelty."
27. See section two, Law of Jan. 2, 1968, translation reprinted in JUGEN
VON UEXKULL, GERMAN PATENT LAW, UTILITYMODEL LAW, AND TRADEMARK
LAW 11 (1968) (6-month grace period for acts based on invention of applicant).
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grace period. 28 Thus, when Germany implemented the Strassbourg
Convention via its Patent Act of 1980, it was forced to remove the
29
grace period provisions from its national law.
At least some interests regretted this change.3 0 As a result,
they began pressing for developments that would restore a grace
period to the German system.31 In particular, WIPO agreed to convene a committee of experts to study the possibility of obtaining a
32
multilateral treaty that would call for the use of a grace period.
The strategy was apparently to obtain an agreement encompassing
countries beyond the EC, and then to press for a corresponding
33
amendment to the European Patent Convention.
In 1983, these two efforts coalesced into the process of negotiating at the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The experts meeting
before WIPO soon realized that the specifics of a grace period also
brought into play other, related issues of patent law, both procedural and substantive. 34 Thus, in order to be successful at defining
a grace period, the subject matter under discussion in the WIPO
negotiations could not be circumscribed narrowly. In addition, the
ongoing nature of the discussions between the EPO, JPO, and
USPTO apparently increased the willingness of those entities to include procedural questions within the negotiations before WIPO.
WIPO therefore terminated the work of its initial committee of
experts after that body had met for one session. To replace the
28. Article 52 of the EPC, for example, requires that patentable inventions
be new. Article 54 defines "new" to mean anything that "does not form part of

the state of the art," i.e., everything not "made available to the public ... before
the date of filing." The EPC thus adopts the requirement of absolute novelty.
29. Compare, e.g., the provision cited supra note 27 with sections one and
three of the German Patent Act of December 16, 1980, translationreprintedin
Beier, supra note 21.
30. For example, the Association for the Protection of Industrial Property
(AIPPI) and the International Federation of Patent Agents (FICPI) passed resolutions in support of a general grace period. 1984 INDUS. PRop. at 320. Beier,

supra note 21, at 19.
31. Joint Hearingson S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of Harold

Wegner) [hereinafter Wegner]. As of this writing, the transcript of this hearing
has not been published.

32. See generally WIPO, Meeting Note on the FirstSession of the Committee
on Experts on the Grace Periodfor Public Disclosure of an Invention Before
Filingan Application, 1984 INDUS. PRoP. 313, and the documents cited therein.
33. Cf. 1984 INDus. PROP. at 324 (asserting international treaty on grace period to be "preferable" because it would create "momentum for changing na-

tional laws").

The operation of the grace period provision in the Patent

Harmonization Treaty is strikingly similar to the operation of the pre-EPC pro-

vision in the German national patent law. Compare the sources cited supra
notes 7 and 27.
34. WIPO History,supra note 5, 3.
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committee, WIPO created a second committee whose mandate extended beyond the issue of harmonizing national provisions relating
to a grace period, and into the broader question of harmonizing patent law generally.3 5 This second committee of experts has now met
on eleven occasions. 36 As one might expect, it initially continued
the former committee's consideration of a grace period, and addi37
tionally considered related procedural and substantive issues.
Throughout the course of its meetings, the committee's activities
have expanded to include numerous other issues relating to patenting. 38 The product of its efforts is the Draft Proposal of the Patent
Harmonization Treaty, which WIPO published in November of
1990. 3 9

B. Structure of the Treaty
Presently, the Patent Harmonization Treaty is structured as a
Special Agreement under the Paris Convention. 40 Twenty four of
the treaty's thirty nine articles address substantive issues of patent
law. The other articles relate to procedural or administrative treaty
matters. 41
Furthermore, a number of the articles are now
35. Id. 4.
36. See the sources cited supra note 7.
37. This new committee initially considered the additional issues of naming
the inventor, whether an oath should be required, and the requisites for establishing a filing date. Note on the FirstSession, 1985 INDUS. PROP. 267.
38. By WIPO's own count, the committee considered new issues in the following pattern: 2d session, four; 3d session, three; 4th session, six; 5th session,
part 1, one; 5th session, part 2, three; 6th session, five. Many new issues appear
to have been considered at the 7th and later sessions. WIPO appears to have
abandoned from that point on the practice of reporting the prior history of the
issues under negotiation. It is not clear whether WIPO originally contemplated
covering as many issues as the treaty now does.
39. See supra note 8.
40. WIPOHistory,supra note 5. Article 19 of the Paris Convention permits
the members of the Paris Union to enter into special agreements, to further the
convention itself, provided they are not inconsistent with the convention. The
European Patent Convention is an example of such an agreement. See generally Beier, supra note 21, at 13-14.
41. See Appendix A for a list of articles from the Basic Proposal
Of these articles, WIPO has now proposed omitting numbers 10, 19, 22, 24,
25 and 26 from the treaty. Memorandum of the Director, supra note 8, at 1 7-8;
Observationsof the InternationalBureau Following the FirstPart (1991) of the
Diplomatic Conference, WIPO, Doc. PLT/DC/69 (Jan. 29, 1993) [hereinafter
Observations]. It has also proposed removing the preamble.
The two stated reasons for this recommendation are that the articles are
controversial, and that they overlap with provisions proposed in the TRIP's negotiations in GATT. Memorandum of the Director, supra note 8, 11 7-8. The
sufficiency of this latter justification, however, appears to be questionable. The
GATT negotiations are at a standstill. In addition, the draft intellectual property provisions of GATT have drawn considerable criticism. See supra note 3.
Thus, it is very uncertain whether the intellectual property provisions in the
current GATT draft will ever become effective. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra
note 3, at 111.
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presented in alternative forms that are to be the subject of further
negotiations. 42
The scope of the treaty is wide. It addresses, at least in broad
terms, virtually the entire field of patent law. Included are detailed
43
provisions relating to questions such as statutory subject matter,
novelty, 44 obviousness, 45 and the rights conferred by patenting 4 matters that are now governed by other, different provisions in the
patent law of the United States.47 In addition, however, the Patent
Harmonization Treaty also addresses legal questions that the
United States has never committed to statute, such as the proper
definition of the doctrine of equivalents 48 and the role of the specification in construing claim scope. 49 By any objective measure, the
treaty is clearly a comprehensive attempt to fix the law of patents
into a definite, particularized set of legal standards, to a degree far
beyond anything the United States has previously attempted.5°
C.

The Diplomatic Conference

Obviously, WIPO has no power to accept treaties on behalf of
the member states of the Paris Union. Both conceptually and practically, the work of WIPO's second committee of experts has been
only preliminary to the creation of the Patent Harmonization
Treaty. The committee's task has been to define a proposed treaty
in sufficient detail that the Paris Union has a realistic chance of
agreeing on a final text through the formal mechanism of a diplo51
matic conference.
In October of 1989, WIPO decided the draft treaty had
progressed to the point where a diplomatic conference could be held
42. PLT, supra note 8, arts. 8-10, 19-20, 22, 24-26.
43. Id. art. 10.
44. Id. arts. 11(2), 12, 13.
45. Id. art. 11(3).
46. E.g., PLT, supra note 8, arts. 19, 20.
47. For a discussion of the specific differences, see Richard C. Wilder, An
Overview of Changes to the Patent Laws of the United States After the Patent
Law Treaty, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 497 (1993).
48. PLT, supra note 8, art. 21(1).
49. Id. art. 21(2).
50. On the degree to which the United States patent law is currently defined by statute, see Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New PatentAct,
at 1-10, reprintedin Title 35, U.S.C.A. (1954 ed.) ("While patents are creatures
of statute, the entire body of patent law is much fuller than the statute itself,
including a vast amount of case material .... ").
The Patent Harmonization Treaty is also to be accompanied by regulations
that amplify and define the language of the treaty itself. PLT, supra note 8, art.
29. Thirteen such regulations are currently proposed, although the treaty contemplates that additional regulations can be added by a three-fourths vote of
the Assembly of the Paris Union. Id. art. 29.
51. See, e.g. GeneralRules of Procedure,WIPO Doc. No. 399(E)Rev.3, at 2526 (1990).
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in June 1991 to consider the matter.52 Supporters hoped the text of
the treaty could be agreed upon and signed at that time.5 3 During
the Spring of 1991, however, various events upset those hopeful
plans. WIPO's committee had held its meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, making the negotiations inaccessible to many interested persons. 54 In addition, WIPO had pushed the committee of experts to
complete a draft treaty quickly.55 This effort outstripped the ability
of the interest groups in the United States to consult their constituencies meaningfully prior to the negotiations. 56 Indeed, the pace of
negotiations arguably outstripped even WIPO's ability to inform the
57
public through its own publications.
52. WIPO, Note on the FirstPartof the Diplomatic Conferencefor the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the ParisConvention as Faras Patents Are
Concerned, 1991 INDUS. PROP. 360 [hereinafter Note on the FirstPartof the Dip-

lomatic Conference].
On its face, it may appear odd for WIPO to decide that the Patent Harmonization Treaty would be ready for the Paris Union's full consideration two years
in advance. At this point it may be useful to note that the intellectual-property
negotiations of GATT, see supra note 3, have taken place concurrently with
WIPO's work on the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The negotiations have addressed many of the same issues. See supra note 41.
This other, rival regime for patent harmonization poses threats to WIPO.
If comprehensive patent-harmonization provisions are finalized in GATT
before the Patent Harmonization Treaty comes into being WIPO risks losing
much of the institutional control it now holds over international patent matters.
See generally Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 18-30, 75-92. WIPO therefore
has considerable reason to push the negotiations over the Patent Harmonization Treaty to a rapid conclusion. See infra note 55. Indeed, some of WIPO's
interests favor creation of the Patent Harmonization Treaty independent of
whether that treaty is sound as a matter of international patent policy.
53. It is clear that WIPO originally thought the Paris Union would finalize
the treaty at this conference. See Note on the First Partof the DiplomaticConference, supra note 52, at 360.
54. As noted supra note 18, the USPTO has not included private-sector representatives in the official delegations of the United States to the negotiations.
It apparently decided to rely on interested persons attending the negotiations
independently.
55. See Kirk, supra note 22, at 605 (describing WIPO as "pushing" the harmonization negotiations "on a fast track"). WIPO's Committee of Experts met
from July 1985 to November 1990 at an average of once every five months.
56. See, e.g., Minutes of the 1991 Midwinter Meeting of the Council of the
ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, ABA-PTC, 1990-91 ANNUAL REPORT 23,25 (reporting statement by William Brunet that the short time
period between WIPO's issuance of the draft treaty and the scheduled beginning of the diplomatic conference "presents a timing problem"); see also Fryer,
supra note 5, at 246 (noting lack of time to prepare for WIPO meeting and need
for interest groups to act "immediately").
57. The Committee appears to have set the topics for each meeting no earlier than the preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Third Session, 1987 INDUS. PROP. 204, 207-08; Note on the Fourth Session, 1988 INDUS. PROP. 174, 183,
185-86; Note on the Second Partof the Fifth Session, 1989 INDUS. PROP. 52, 59-60,
62. WIPO's International Bureau, moreover, which acted as Secretariat at the
negotiations, often did not publish summaries of meetings for two to three
months. See generally WIPO's Meeting Notes supra note 7. It appears, in fact,
that the International Bureau of WIPO at times placed items on the agenda for
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As a consequence, several members of the Paris Union were in
fact less willing to make concessions than their negotiating delegations had indicated during the meetings of the committee. 5s Perhaps the most prominent example of such unwillingness involved
the United States' position on changing to a "first-to-file" priority
rationale. In a move not widely noted at the time, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks had indicated to the committee
of experts in 1987 that the United States would be willing to consider changing its national law of patents in such a manner.5 9 Subsequent drafts of the treaty incorporated that offer of change. 60 In
early 1991, however, the PTO realized that the relevant groups in6
side the United States did not strongly support such a change. '
Therefore, the United States proposed that the treaty include an
alternative provision that would allow the United States to retain
its first-to-invent priority rationale, but make other, hopefully offsetting changes in its laws. 62
The net effect of these late movements away from consensus
was to prevent the Paris Union from finalizing the treaty at the
June 1991 session of the diplomatic conference. 63 The Paris Union
a meeting and issued explanatory reports only qfter the conclusion of the last
preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Second Session, supra note 7, at 311.
58. See, e.g., Harry Manbeck, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
Address to the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference (June 19, 1991), excerpt
reprintedin BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY, Sept. 4, 1991 [hereinafter Manbeck Speech]. Gutterman, supra note 3, at 107.
59. InternationalDevelopments/Patents: U.S. Offers to Adopt First-to-File
as Partof a Balanced Packageof Reforms, 33 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT. J. 581 (1987). See Note on the Third Session, 1987 INDUS. PROP. 204, 205
(noting U.S. delegation's statement that it would be "favorably inclined to consider" changing priority rule).
60. E.g., Draft Treaty on the Harmonization of Certain Provisionsin Laws
for the Protection of Inventions, WIPO Doc. No. HL/CE/IV/2, art. 301 (1987),
reprintedin 1988 INDUS. PROP. 179, 187-88 (draft treaty for discussion at fourth
negotiating session).
61. See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 19, at 442 (observing that, as of January 1991,
"no organized support" beyond a "few individuals" was being shown in favor of
adopting a first-to-file priority system in the United States). Letter of Hon.
Harry Manbeck, Comm'r. of Patents, to Arpad Bogsch, Dir. General of WIPO,
Feb. 22, 1991, reprinted in 5 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 93-94 (1991) (asserting lack
of support for a first-to-file system in the private sector in the United States).
62. Draft Articles 9, 11, and 13, The United States of America, Doc.
PLT/DC/6 (Mar. 1, 1991), reprinted in Records, supra note 5. See generally
USPTO ProposesFirst-to-InventOption in Harmonization Treaty, 5 WORLD INTELL. PROP. 93 (1991); Kirk, supra note 19, at 442 (discussing substance of
proposal).
63. See Note on the First Part of the DiplomaticConference, supra note 52,
at 360. This document reports that Paris Union Assembly decided, in April
1991, to shorten the duration of the June 1991, session of the diplomatic conference and continue the conference into a second part. WIPO abandoned its attempts to finalize the treaty in 1991 at this time. See also WIPO Postpones
Decision on US. Proposal to Change International Patent Law, BNA PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY, May 1, 1991 (discussing WIPO's decision to
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therefore extended the conference to include a second, future session.64 Originally unscheduled, 65 that second session was to be held
in the summer of 1993.6 Changes associated with the new presidential administration, however, have rendered the United States
unable to fully participate by that date. During the preparation of
this paper, WIPO therefore postponed the second session of the dip67
lomatic conference indefinitely.
postpone consideration of the United States' proposed amendments to the Paris
Convention).

For reports of the generally divisive effects of these late developments, see,
e.g., Manbeck Speech, supra note 58; Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and
the House Subcommittee on IntellectualProperty and JudicialAdministration
of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary,138 CONG. REC. D487
(statement of the Hon. Harry Manbeck, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Manbeck Statement] (describing
reaction of foreign delgations to United States proposal); William J. & Michael
N. Meller, Report on Diplomatic Conferencefor PatentHarmonization Treaty,
BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY, Sept. 4, 1991.

Some foreign interest groups, however, were receptive to the alternative
U.S. proposal. See, e.g., International Federation of Industrial Property Counsel, FICPIPosition Paperfor the Diplomatic Conferencefor the Conclusion of a
Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as Far as Patents Are Concerned
(Patent Law Harmonization Treaty), at 1-2 (May 6, 1991) [hereinafter FICPI
Position Paper]; Remarks of Bardehle at the Spring-Stated Meeting of the
AIPLA (May 2, 1991), 1991 AIPLA BuLL. 633, 636 (July-Sept. 1991).
64. See, e.g., Note on the FirstPartof the DiplomaticConference, supra note
52.
65. Id.
66. See Memorandum of the Director General, supra note 8 for a description of the rescheduled second session.
67. Report of the Assembly, Twentieth Session (10th Extraordinary) WIPO
Doc. No. P/A/xx/1 (Apr. 5, 1993). Those in the United States who favor harmonization have labored during the interim to create a consensus in favor of the
treaty. The Intellectual Property Section of the American Bar Association, for
example, was asked at both its 1991 and 1992 annual meetings to adopt a
number of resolutions in favor of harmonization. Action taken on resolutions
at the Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia - August 1991, 10 PTC Newsletter,
No. 1, 3 (1991); Action taken on resolutions at the Annual Meeting in San Francisco, California - August 1992, 11 PTC Newsletter, No. 1, 9 (1992). The Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform addressed several of the specifics of
harmonization in its September 1992 Report to the Secretary of Commerce. Report to the Commissioner, 41-72 (1992). The leadership of the American Intellectual Property Law Association continues to support harmonization strongly.
See, e.g., 1991 Annual Meeting Report of the Harmonization Committee, 1991
AIPLA BuLL. 128 (Oct.-Nov. 1991).
Perhaps the most important of these efforts is the legislation that was introduced in Congress during 1992, and which will probably be reintroduced in
1993. See supra note 11. Generally speaking, that legislation seeks to place the
United States on record as favoring the Patent Harmonization Treaty.
The odd structure of the legislation shows that the pro-harmonization
forces in the United States are at this time concerned primarily with resistance
that is domestic, and not foreign. The legislation does not simply authorize
representatives of the United States to pursue negotiations. Rather, it seeks to
commit the United States, in advance, to adopt what are considered to be the
major concessions in substantive patent law that harmonization would involve.
E.g., S. 2605, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1991) (amending Title 35 U.S.C. to incor-
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II.

PRIOR HARMONIZATION EFFORTS

The facts set out in the foregoing section are, to many, the complete history of the Patent Harmonization Treaty. In reality, however, the treaty is only the latest in a long series of international
agreements that have addressed foreign patenting. Many such
agreements exist already.68 Generally speaking, all involve patent
harmonization to some extent: they provide for the coordination,
between countries, of national legal provisions relating to patents. 69
Patent harmonization is therefore an old concept and not a new
70
one.
Common sense suggests that this prior history is relevant to the
Patent Harmonization Treaty. The basic structure of international
patenting transactions remains unchanged from at least the 1800's:
an inventor seeking foreign patent rights must enter the legal system of that foreign country and submit to its requirements for pat72
enting. 71 Patent systems remain instruments of national policy.
For these reasons, the basic problems of international patenting,
and the general concerns that affect their resolution, should be
porate first-to-file priority). The effective date of the legislation will be tied to
the date on which Japan and Europe adhere to the treaty. Thus, a major concern among pro-harmonization forces in the United States at this time clearly is
convincing foreign delegations that the United States wants to harmonize.
68. The first and most notable is the Paris Convention, but others, such as
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 28 T.I.A.S. 7645 (1970), and the European Patent Convention, reprinted in PATERSON, supra note 23, at 499, are also well
known.
69. See supra note 1 for a definition of harmonization.
70. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 49 (noting that "[t]he dream of many [who
participated in the creation of the Paris Convention] was complete uniformity
of the laws protecting industrial property in all nations."); Beier, supra note 21,
at 5; EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHMUSTER IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 45-62 (1935).
71. See generally WIPO, General Information, 15-16 (1992); William R. Cornish, The InternationalRelations of Intellectual Property, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
46, 47-48 (1993). One alternate structure is agreement to rely on an extra-national process for the grant of national patents. An example of this structure is
the reliance, by the member countries of the EPC, on the granting procedure
before the European Patent Office. See European Patent Convention, art. 64,
reprintedin Leaffer, supra note 6, at 167 ("A European patent shall ... confer
on its proprietor .... in each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted,
the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that
State."). The provisions of Chapter II of the Patent Cooperation Treaty have
this same general structure, although they not binding as yet. Another structure involves agreement to rely on initial grant and liability determinations that
are both extra-national. The Community Patent Convention, reprinted in 1
MARY VITORIA ET. AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED KINGDOM & EUROPEAN PATENT LAw 5001 (1990), is an example of such an agreement, although it is not in
force. The United States has never been party to any such agreement.
72. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 88-89; Beier, supra note 21, at 9;
Cornish, supra note 71, at 47-48. The assertion results from the fact that national patent systems remain the creation of individual national governments.
See generally Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 136-38.
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largely unchanged. 73
The following discussion therefore examines the history of
multilateral efforts to address foreign patenting. The examination
74
is general; its purpose is not to review that history in full detail.
Rather, the examination uses history to test certain assertions regarding the motivations and systematic behavior of the participants.
A.

InternationalPatentingPriorto the Formation of

MultilateralAgreements
The national patent systems that existed prior to the Paris
Convention often contained widely varying legal rules.75 The
United States, for example, examined patent applications substantively,76 while many European countries did not.7 7 Most countries
published the technical disclosures of patent applications upon
grant, some held the disclosures in secret until after the patent expired, 78 while still others published the disclosure immediately
upon filing. 79 Generally speaking, the variation between national
73. It is certainly true that the amount of international trade has increased
greatly since the 1800's. See, e.g., irqfra notes 12-15. How this trend should
affect the debate over international patenting, however, is unclear. Increasing
international trade has doubtless made it increasingly important that we resolve the issues of international patenting correctly. Yet international trade
includes both imports and exports. As the following discussion demonstrates,
the mere fact that international trade has increased therefore does not determine, per se, which resolution of the issues is proper.
74. Sources discussing this history in the English language are extremely
sparse. Almost no original documents exist in that language prior to 1900. See,
e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE THE STATUTES RELATING TO PATENTS, TRADE AND OTHER MARKS, AND TRADE AND COMMERICAL

NAMES UNDER ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED JUNE 4, 1898, S. Misc. 20, 56th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1902). Later summaries include PENROSE, supra note 20, at 4257; LADAS, supra note 20, at 59-68: Beier, supra note 21, at 1; STRINGHAM, supra
note 69 at 45-62; ULF ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LEGISLATION AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65-92 (1971). Kronstein & Till, supra note 20. The
literature in French and German is apparently much more extensive.
75. See generally PENROSE, supra note 20, at 1-18. For a modern discussion
of these divergencies from the viewpoint of a patent lawyer, see LADAS, supra
note 20, at 20-27.
76. The United States instituted its system of examining patent applications
substantively in 1836. The move was in reaction to the high frequency with
which patents issued under the prior registration system were being invalidated
in court actions.
77. See, e.g., CHARLES S. WHITMAN, PATENT LAWS AND PRACTICE OF OBTAINING LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS (1871). The French system was the
most notable example of such a registration system. Id. at 152; LADAS, supra
note 20, at 23-24. Italy examined only applications for inventions that related to
beverages and food. WHITMAN, supra, at 165.
78. Austria and the Netherlands, for example. WHITMAN, supra note 77, at
63-64, 174.
79. This was certainly the practice of countries that awarded patents via
registration. See supra note 77. In addition, England and Germany advertised
pending applications prior to grant. LADAS, supra note 20, at 23-24.
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provisions at the time appears to have been substantially larger
than exists today.8°
These variations in national patent practices created procedural obstacles to the international assertion of patent rights.8 ' In
those countries that published patent disclosures immediately upon
filing, for example, the mere act of applying for patent disclosed the
invention publicly. At the same time, other countries conditioned
patentability on absolute novelty worldwide.8 2 Applying for a patent in one country could thus create an absolute barrier to obtaining a valid patent in another.8 3
These procedural obstacles to patenting generally appear to
have arisen inadvertently. There also existed at this time, however,
another category of obstacles that national governments had erected purposefully. The obstacles in this second category were essentially protectionist.84 By the late 1800's European and United
States scholars had explored the economics of patenting extensively.s5 As explained below, many granting sovereigns had begun
to manipulate their national patent laws to enrich themselves in
relation to their trading partners.
1.

The protection of national wealth from foreign patenting

Patent systems are large-scale governmental intrusions into
the free-market economy. They involve manipulating social costs
and benefits to increase the national wealth. 86 Perhaps the most
significant cost of such systems is the higher prices imposed on con80. The improved situation today may be due to the normalizing influence
of the harmonization agreements that have already been put into place. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 1.

81. See LADAS, supra note 20, at 22.
82. Ladas lists these countries as including France, Spain, Sweden, and Italy. Id. at 22-23.
83. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 69-70; LADAS, supra note 20, at 26. Ladas
asserts that filing applications simultaneously in multiple countries was the
only means of assuring the issuance of corresponding foreign patents.
84. E.g., Fritze Malchup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the
Ninetheenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 28-29 (1950); PENROSE, supra note 20,
at 88-89; ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 99-100. Cf. Beier, supra note 21, at 9. As
to the general validity of this dual categorization of patenting obstacles, see, e.g.,
LADAS, supra note 20, at 20.
85. This literature is summarized in Patent Controversy. Malchup & Penrose, supra note 84, at 9-10. The economic analyses of patenting in the 1800's
were said to compare favorably with the literature on the subject offered as
recently as the 1950's. Id.
86. E.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property and the Economics of
Preemption,76 IowA L. REV. 959, 962 (1991). See, e.g., VICTOR ABRAMSON, THE
PATENT SYSTEM: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASIS, PATENT STUDY No. 26 OF
THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE

ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SEN., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1958)
(reports in this set are hereinafter referred to individually as Patent Study No.
-).
MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 58.
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sumers of the patented advance.8 7 If the patented technology has
some economic value s the patent owner is able to impose singlesource pricing on it - a price that is higher than would exist in a
8 9
truly competitive market.
Patent systems exist because this social cost of higher prices is
presumed to result in an increased pace of invention. 90 Higher
prices transfer increased amounts of money from consumers of the
patented technology to producers. Knowing this, inventors will
strive to invent patentable technology more vigorously. Some will
succeed who otherwise would have failed. The sophistication of the
country's industrial base thus increases, and new technology becomes available to consumers. According to the presumption, the
social benefits of this increased rate of invention are large enough
to more than offset the costs of patenting.9 1
In a purely domestic economy the national effects of these costs
and benefits are linked together relatively tightly. Each unit of increased cost imposed on domestic consumers provides a unit of increased revenue to domestic industry. Evaluating such a patent
system therefore involves, in large part, estimating the amount of
increased invention that will actually result from a given increase
in expected revenue. 92 In addition, the increased resources diverted
to a domestic patent owner are not wholly lost to the domestic economy. Rather, the domestic patent owner generally will reinvest all
or a part of those resources, thereby mitigating the cost of patenting
93
to some degree.
International patenting, on the other hand, de-couples the national effects of patenting. Assume that an inventor exploits the
advance through patenting, not in his or her own country, but in a
foreign country. In that situation industry domestic to the inven87. The result is society's underutilization of the advance. E.g.,

ANDERFELT,

supra note 74, at 58. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 60-62.
88. Of course, technology is not necessarily valuable merely because it has
been patented. See, e.g., DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS § 4.02 (1992) (economic rationale for minimal utility requirement in the United States); SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981) (relation of patent rights to market

power in antitrust context). The text means to restrict the discussion to those
patented advances that consumers find desireable over pre-existing technology.
89. E.g.,

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

195-99 (2d ed.

1977); Kitch, supra note 16, at 266-67; MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 58-60.
90. See, e.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 44-45; PENROSE, supra note 20, at
94.
91. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 55, 76-79; RAYMOND VERNON, THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY, PATENT STUDY No. 5, 6 (1957).
92. E.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 63-66; Richard P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of PatentScope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 878-

80 (1990).
93. See PENROSE, supra note 20, at 145-60. Cf. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at
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tor's own country receives increased profits from patenting, but domestic consumers do not pay the associated higher prices. Instead,
the higher prices are imposed on consumers in the foreign country. 94 International patent transactions therefore reallocate wealth
away from the granting country and into the country of the patent
95
owner.
Prior to the Paris Convention many countries had acted on this
basic economic truth. Their national laws included numerous, varied provisions that curtailed the domestic patent rights of foreign
nationals. Some countries, for example, had adopted compulsorylicensing provisions. 96

By their very nature, compulsory licenses

lower the cost of the patented advance closer to multiple-source

pricing. 97 In addition, if the complusory license is given to a domestic entity a portion of the foreign trade is prevented outright. 98
Both these mechanisms reduce the amount of wealth that flows out
of the country into the hands of the foreign patent owner.
Another type of protectionist provision motivated by the same
economic calculation was the widespread presence of national
working requirements." Generally, these provisions required patent owners to supply domestic demand for the patented technology
94. Cf. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 79. In addition, the probability that the
patent owner will reinvest the proceeds from patenting into the economy of the
granting country is in all likelihood reduced. See, e.g., VERNON, supra note 91,
at 7. The mitigating influence on the cost patenting discussed supra note 93, is
thus removed. See e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 145-60. Cf. ANDERFELT,
supra note 72, at 80-81.
95. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 55; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 95-96. See
also ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 127-29; VERNON, supra note 91, at 12-13.
96. E.g., LADAs, supra note 20, at 26; MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 5. See
generally FREDRIK NEUMEYER, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER
SOME NON-AMERICAN SYSTEMS, Patent Study No. 19 (1959). PENROSE, supra
note 20, at 164-69.
97. E.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 73-74. VERNON, supra note 91, at 13.
The difference is roughly the cost of the royalty. Most systems require that the
royalty be assessed at a level that is reasonable. The inherent indeterminacy of
this standard, coupled with the fact that its calculation is ultimately in the
hands of the granting nations' government, exposes foreign patentees to obvious
risks. For a discussion of the effects of compulsory licensing in an international
context, see PENROSE, supra note 20, at 152-68.
98. Penrose asserts, for example, that this consideration motivated England's introduction of compulsory licensing in its Patents Act of 1910. PENROSE,
supra note 20, at 82 n.58. See also Kronstein & Till, supra note 20, at 778.
99. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 65-66, 99-100. VERNON, supra note 91,
at 3; Montgomery, InternationalAspects of PatentLegislation, 31 J. POL. ECON.
90, 93-94 (1928). France appears to have been the most notable example. The
laws of that country not only required the invention be worked domestically;
they also forbade the importation of any product covered by a French patent.
Thus, French demand could be supplied only by domestic French production.
E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 75.
Ladas does not classify working requirements as protectionist measures.
See generally LADAS, supra note 20. His work has been criticized, however, as
unsophisticated in economic matters.
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through domestic production. The failure to do so resulted in the
patent becoming invalid or unenforceable. Facially neutral with regard to nationality, working requirements had an obviously greater,
purposeful impact on patent owners who were foreign.' ° In essence, foreign patentees were required to either abandon their patent rights or behave as if they were domestic entities.
2.

The protection of domestic industry from uneven
internationalpatenting

In addition to increased prices, patents impose another social
cost that is relevant to international patenting: they retard further
research in the patented technology.' 0 ' Patents commonly dominate inventions that remain to be discovered and patented themselves.10 2 Once a patent issues, therefore, every person other than
the patent owner has a reduced expectation of return from further
research in the areas of technology that the patent dominates. 0 3
Rationally, then, researchers will reduce their inventive efforts in
i 4
technology that is dominated by another's patent.1
If competition
100. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 65-66; MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 17
n.92; VERNON, supra note 91, at 35-36; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 143. A domestic inventor will either already have production facilities that are located domestically or, generally speaking, be able to arrange for the construction of
facilities more easily than will a foreign inventor.
101. E.g., Kitch, supra note 16; Merges & Nelson, supra note 92; Mark F.
Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV.
305 (1992); MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 63-64; KAUFER, supra note 16.
102. The ability of patents to be related in dominant-subservient relationships is well known. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 16, at 268-69. Such patents are
related in one of three ways: a patent to the generic invention may dominate a
later-discovered specie; a patent to a subcombination may dominate later-discovered combinations that incorporate the subcombination; and a patent to a
product may dominate later-discovered methods of making and/or using the
product.
103. The owner of the dominating patent will extract royalties from the inventor of the improvement, thus forcing the newcomer to share his or her profits. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 101-03. In addition, in countries that do
not provide for compulsory licensing, the newcomer risks being denied commercial use of the technology altogether by the dominant patent owner's refusal to deal. A number of countries ameliorate this latter effect by giving
compulsory licenses to owners of subservient, or "dependent," patents. See, e.g.,
NEUMEYER, supra note 96, at 28-30.
104. Penrose cites as an example the stagnation of Britain's incandascent
lamp industry in the 1800's after the initial grant of broad patents to a domestic
entity. PENROSE, supra note 20. Merges & Nelson assert that the effect has
recurred in a number of industries. Merges & Nelson, supra note 92, at 884-908.
As a more recent example, a large United States manufacturer of health-care
devices is reported to have moved a portion of its research facilities to Europe in
response to another entity's dominant patent in this country. Thomas Burton,
Aid for Racing Hearts Could Also be a Boon to a PacemakerFirm, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 12, 1993, at Al, A8.
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spurs the speed of research, 10 5 this reduction in competition will
slow industrial development over time. The issue in a purely domestic economy is optimally balancing the initial incentive to the
1 °6
original patent owner with the detriment to future researchers.
With international patenting, however, the problem becomes
more complex. The teachings of an issued patent can travel beyond
the borders of the granting sovereign and into other countries. 10 7
Corresponding patent rights in such other countries may, or may
not, exist.' 0 8 In countries where they do not, the public learns of
the advance and yet is free from the economic impediment of dominating patent rights. Technological development therefore continues unabated. In countries where dominant patent rights do exist,
in contrast, only the holder of the dominant patent is fully motivated to continue researching. Over time, this risks reducing the
industrial sophistication of the patenting country in comparision to
that of the non-patenting country. 1 9
105. Interestingly, lawyer-scholars active in the area have been unable to
agree whether competition in research is economically efficient. Compare
Kitch, supra note 16, at 276, with Merges & Nelson, supra note 92, at 871-78.
The sources cited in the preceding footnote support the narrower proposition,
made in the text, that competition increases the speed with which invention
occurs.

In any event, it would appear that the proposition in the text can be accepted as true for present purposes, inasmuch as patent systems reflect the general attempt to increase the speed of innovation by fostering competitive
research. E.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 50-52. See generally WILLIAM G.
SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 145-51 (2d ed. 1985).

106. See generally supra note 101.
107. This can be due to any of a number of reasons, such as a national of one
country gaining access to a copy of a patent granted in another, or because of
international commerce in the patented good itself. See generally ANDERFELT,
supra note 74, at 136-37; VERNON, supra note 91, at 17; PENROSE, supra note 20,
at 100. Knowledge of the technology embodied in patented inventions appears
to have traveled internationally routinely in the 1800's, particularly in Europe.
With the common-language filings of the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the
European Patent Convention, the availability of such foreign-patent teachings
is probably far greater today. This ability to obtain technical information without granting national rights to the inventor seriously undercuts any attempt to
rely on the traditional rationale of fostering disclosure in the context of international patenting.
108. During the early time period under discussion, the time-wise duration
of national patents varied greatly beween countries. E.g., LADAS, supra note 20,
at 24-25.
109. See ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 137-39; Kronstein & Till, supra note
20, at 774; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 133-35. This fact casts serious doubt on the
viability of Kitch's prospect theory of patenting. Kitch, supra note 16. Kitch's
theory relies on the efficiencies that arguably arise from placing control of technological development in the hands of a single firm. It has been attacked with
the argument that competitive research is more efficient. Merges & Nelson,
supra note 92.
At a more basic level, because the rights conferred by national patents are
territorially limited, national patents do not provide the single-firm control
over the patented technology upon which Kitch's theory depends. Instead,
multi-firm competition to develop improvements is largely inescapable. Any
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These economic considerations spurred a number of countries
to act during the early period of international patenting. Primary
among those actions were national provisions that caused domestic
patents to expire as soon as any corresponding foreign patent expired."10 In operation, these provisions freed domestic industry
from the constraining effects of patenting as soon as the industry in
another country became free.
In total, these various protectionist provisions inflicted immense difficulties on patent owners."' Often, one simply could not
obtain patent rights in a foriegn country. Even if a foreign patent
could be obtained, many times its continued existence depended on
the patent owner rapidly initiating manufacture in that foreign
country.
This could be disadvantageous for many different
12
reasons."
B.

The ParisConvention

Prior to the Paris Convention essentially no international
agreements addressed the obstacles to international patenting set
out in the preceding section.'1 3 Instead, patent owners who wished
to assert patent rights in foreign countries were forced to rely on
their own resources. As a practical matter, they were forced to restrict the number of countries in which they sought patent
protection.
In 1883, a decade-long process of negotiation culminated in a
number of countries signing the Paris Convention. 1 4 Although the
creation of the convention was an act of international diplomacy,
the participants in the negotiations included not only representatives of national governments, but representatives of industrial interests as well."15 It appears, in fact, that the negotiations began
attempt to rely on Kitch's prosect theory would therefore be largely futile. See
generally PENROSE, supra note 20.
110. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note 20, at 27-28. The United States had such a

provision until 1897, when it was replaced by the predecessor of Title 35, U.S.C.
§ 102(d) (1987). CHISUM, supra note 88, § 6.04[1].
111. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 65-66; LADAS, supra note 20, at 26-28.
112. See, e.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 138; PENROSE, supra note 20, at
107-08. See LADAS, supra note 20, at 29.
113. Only two bilateral treaties regarding patents existed prior to the formation of the Paris Convention. LADAS, supra note 20, at 45-46.
114. See sources cited supra note 74. The process involved congresses at two
major industrial conferences, the International Exhibition of Vienna in 1873
and the Paris Exhibition of 1878. In addition, the negotiators convened a third
congress in Paris in 1880.
115. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 66-69. The large presence of industrial interests during the negotiations has been detailed by various writers. E.g.,
PENROSE, supra note 20, at 45-57; Beier, supra note 21, at 2-3. Beier asserts that
this influence has continued. Id. at 13.
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primarily at the insistence of industrial interests.

16

As the following discussion details, the Paris Convention addressed a portion of the obstacles to international patenting. At the
same time, other obstacles remained unresolved. 117 This partial
failure raises an immediate question: Why was agreement on those
issues not reached? Many causes doubtlessly contributed."l 8 At the
same time, however, the pattern of successes and failures suggests
that the different economic interests of the various parties to the
negotiations was a significant cause. In particular, agreement appears to have been possible only where the economic interests of
national government and industry coincided. 119
1.

Patent owners vs. the nationalinterest

It is axiomatic that the interests of national government will
tend to be national in scope. With regard to patenting, these interests will include the full range of social costs and benefits of a patthe potential benefits of an increased rate of
ent system:
innovation, for example, as well as the costs of higher consumer
prices, the costs of adminstering the patent system, and the costs
borne by other endeavors from whom the increased resources spent
120
on patenting have been diverted.
This focus on both the costs and the benefits of patenting
should also hold true with regard to transactions of international
patenting. A national government will be concerned with the increased incentive that patent rights in foriegn countries bestow
upon its domestic industry.' 21 Government will also be concerned
with the domestic costs of awarding patents to foreigners: the loss
of national wealth from importation of patented goods, and the potential stunting of domestic industry via international patenting
122
that is uneven.
116. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20.
117. See infra notes 133-38. As to the results of the Paris Convention,
Malchup states: "Only a few of the irksome problems of foreign patenting were
solved and no progress was made toward the establishment of an 'international
patent.'" MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 18.
118. For a general discussion of the difficulties of harmonizing substantive
patent law, see LADAS, supra note 20, at 13-16.
119. Scholars in the field of negotiation theory agree that negotiated agreements are possible generally only where the parties have compatible interests.
See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 73 (1981); HowARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45 (1982).

120. See, e.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 63-65, for a review of the social
costs and benefits of patenting.
121. See generally VERNON, supra note 91, at 14; PENROSE, supra note 20, at
114-15.
122. See PENROSE, supra note 20, at 114 (noting that "[t]he question ...

is

whether the gain to any particular economy from obtaining patents in other
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Industry's view of patenting, in contrast, is potentially quite different. Industry will be concerned with how patenting affects its
own, private interests. 123 Those interests will in all liklihood be
very different from the interests of society as a whole. 124 For example, patent systems rely entirely on the incentive of increased profits to spur innovative activity. Patenting therefore bestows large
private benefits on industry. 125 At the same time, the social costs of
patenting are generally spread throughout society. They therefore
126
impose private costs on industry to a much lesser degree.
This observation is very significant. Unless one views inventors
as entitled to monopoly profits naturally, patent systems must be
seen as societal mechanisms for providing an optimal amount of incentive to invent. 27 To determine that amount of incentive, one
must consider more than industry's narrow, private interests. The
result of that broader calculation need not coincide with industry's
preferences. Thus, society can prefer rules of patent law that industry would not choose. Stated conversely, industry can prefer rules
of patent law that are adverse to society. The differences of position
28
between the two groups should be systematic.
For the same reasons, industry and national governments
should also have systematically different interests with regard to
countries is likely to offset the costs of granting domestic patents to foreign
non-resident patentees").
123. E.g. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 56-62. Malchup presents a summary of
the concepts of private vs. social costs and benefits. Id. at 56-58.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., id., at 58; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 126. Of course, the statement in the text applies not to all industry, but to those industrial entities that
expect to obtain significant patent rights. Firms that intend to seek patents

more aggressively will therefore tend to weigh the benefits of patenting more

strongly than will nonpatenting firms. Patent-seeking firms may be more prevalent in some industries than others. See generally Merges & Nelson, supra

note 92.
126. Of the various social costs identified by Malchup, only the costs of faster
obsolescence and dominating patent rights appear to result in private costs that

are concentrated in industry. MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 64. Of particular
note, the costs associated with single-source pricing over the patented advance

appear to be widely diffused throughout society. Kitch asserts that the courts
have viewed such output restrictions as the main cost of patenting. Kitch, supra
note 16, at 282.

127. That is, the amount of incentive at which the social gains from further
induced invention begins to fall short of offsetting the associated increase in
social costs. See, e.g, PENROSE, supra note 20, at 94-95.
128. This proposition is a basic one that has been repeatedly understood in
the scholarly literature, although not always considered worthy of express
statement. See, e.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 99; PENROSE, supra note 20,
at 91, 126. It is expressly stated here in recognition of the fact that some mem-

bers of the patent bar either disagree or have not considered the matter in
depth.
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international patenting."2 If they behave rationally according to
economic criteria, national governments will be interested in obtaining agreements that maximize the wealth of their individual
countries. These will be agreements whose operation bestows on
the particular national economy both large benefits and small costs
from international patenting. 130 Industry, in contrast, will seek the
private benefits of increased international patenting' 3' but will be
relatively unconcerned with any associated social costs. In particular, industry will be largely unconcerned with whether a disproportionate share of such costs falls on any particular national economy,
132
including that of its own country.
In essence, because the parties to an international sale of a patented item each belong to a different national economy, their private costs and gains become social costs and gains for the countries
involved. For example, where a national of the country under consideration holds a foreign patent, the sale of goods under that patent transfers wealth out of the foreign country into the hands of the
patent-owning national. The national's private gain is thus a social
gain for the national's own country. Conversely, where a country
has granted one of its patents to a foreigner, the domestic sale of
goods under the patent impoverishes domestic consumers and enriches the foreign patentee. The consumer's private cost is thus a
social cost to the granting country. The outlook of national government differs from that of its patent-owning industry because the
nation participates in both import and export transactions, while
industry is largely preoccupied with exports.
2.

The agreement to foster increasedforeign patenting

The structure of the Paris Convention is consistent with the
operation of these economic interests. Foreign patenting, for exam129. See generally ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 76-77; Beier, supra note 21,
at 13-20.
130. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 114-15, 119-20, 123.
131. Again, to the extent that the individual industrial entities expect to receive significant patent rights in foreign countries. E.g., PENROSE, supra note
20, at 115. See supra note 125.
This factor can explain why independent inventors and small businesses
have such small enthusiasm for the Patent Harmonization Treaty. See, e.g., 138
CONG. REC. H7370-72 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Bentley). Obtaining and enforcing patents in foreign countries is notoriously difficult. Large
corporations with heavy R&D expenditures and extensive foreign sales can
generally overcome these difficulties. Independent inventors and small companies, in contrast, are generally less able to do so. Because these groups are less
likely to obtain the benefits of increased foreign patenting the associated costs
may become relatively more significant to them.
132. Cf. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 131 (concluding that some form of international patenting is necessary to prevent stronger industrial countries from
forcing weaker industrial countries to accept oppressive patent agreements).
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ple, is crucial to the objectives of both industry and national government. Patents provide the market power that yields increased
profits to industry. If such increased profits are to be had on foreign sales, industry must obtain foreign patents. Those same increased profits on foreign sales, moreover, appear to be the major
mechanism by which countries enrich themselves through international patenting.133 National government is thus interested in
seeing its citizens obtain as many foreign patents as possible. Additionally, foreign patents are needed to constrain the industrial development of competing countries while an advance is subject to
domestic patent rights.
For these reasons, one would expect easy agreement in the
Paris Convention to increase the general availability of foreign patenting. The interests of national governments are more or less the
same on this particular issue. 3 4 In addition, the self interests of
national governments and industry generally coincide.
The original text of the Paris Convention shows such easy
agreement on this issue through the concept of foreign priority:
Any one who shall have regularly deposited an application for a
patent of invention... in one of the contracting States, shall enjoy for
the purpose of making the deposit in the other States .

.

. a right of

priority under the periods hereinafter determined.
In consequence, the deposit subsequently made in one of the other
States of the Union, before the expiration of [this] period cannot be
invalidated by acts performed in the interval, especially by another deposit, by the publication of the invention or by its working by a third
133. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 113-14, 119-20. Foreign patents
owned by entities domestic to a particular country can be counted as additions
to that country's national wealth. See, e.g., MALCHUP, supra note 16, at 55.
134. This statement is subject to at least one major caveat. Some countries
may have few domestic inventors and thus be less likely to obtain foreign patents even in an "open patenting" regime. Undeveloped and less developed
countries present particular examples. Such countries may well conclude that
the gains from a greater freedom to patent internationally are, from their national perspective, at best hypothetical. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 96,
115-17. Anderfelt's work explores various implications of this problem. See also
Douglas F. Greer, The Case Against the PatentSystem in Developing Countries,
8 J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 223 (1973) (concluding that the costs which less developed
countries incurr from international patenting outweigh the potential gains
which such countries will receive); Gutterman, supra note 3, at 89. There are
indications, however, that this issue was not present in the initial negotiations
over the Paris Convention. ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 92 (asserting that
original negotiations included only industrialized countries and those with no
national patent systems). More recently, increasing numbers of less developed
countries have become signatory to the Paris Convention. E.g., ANDERFELT,
supra note 74, at 92-97; Beier, supra note 21, at 14-15. This has led to the increasing occurrance of "north-south" splits in international patenting issues, as
developing countries act on their main interest of stopping the outflow of
wealth to foreign patentees. E.g., EC OfficialsExpress Concern over Unresolved
TRIPs Issues, 5 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 215 (1991) (describing "clear northsouth split" over the patentability of pharmaceuticals).
See generally
ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 133-35; Beier, supra note 21, at 14-20.
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As a result of this provision, an inventor could establish a date of
filing in all member countries via an initial filing in a single country. The act of applying for patent rights on the same invention in
136
several foreign countries was therefore made much easier.
3. The failure to stem protectionistprovisions
As to protectionist provisions, the economic interests of national government and patent owners appear to diverge. National
government is critically interested in retaining the freedom to impose protectionist provisions. By definition, these provisions reduce
the outflow of national wealth to foreign patentees. They are an
important means of minimizing the domestic costs of international
patenting.
Industry, in contrast, will be generally opposed to protectionist
provisions. Protectionist provisions reduce the market power of industry's foreign patents. Industry will therefore object to their
presence in the patent sytems of foreign countries and will seek
their abolition. In addition, because others pay the private costs of
increased patents on imports, industry has little reason to favor protectionist provisions in the domestic patent system of its own
country.
Under an economic analysis, therefore, patent-owning industry
will seek broad prohibitions against protectionist measures. In contrast, each national government will seek to preserve at least those
protectionist provisions that operate to the country's own net benefit. Based upon these fundamentally different interests one would
expect difficulty in achieving any agreement to eradicate protectionist provisions generally.
The historical course of negotiations over the Paris Convention
is consistent with this analysis as well. The original text of the
Paris Convention contained conspicuously little with regard to the
two most widespread protectionist measures, working requirements
and compulsory licenses:
The introduction by the patentee into countries where the patent
has been granted, of articles manufactured in any other of the States of
the Union, shall not entail forfeiture.
The patentee, however, shall be subject to the obligation of working his patent conformably to the laws of the country into which he has
135. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Paris, Mar. 20,
1883, art. 4, 1 T.S. 80, 82. The provisions relating to industrial models, designs,
and trademarks are omitted. Originally six months, the period of priority for
inventions is now one year. Stockholm Revision, art. 4(c), 21 U.S.T. 1629, 1632.
136. See generally PENROSE, supra note 20, at 67-71, 90; LADAS, supra note
20, at 93.
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137
introduced the patented articles.

The text did require signatories to permit importation. At the same
time, it specifically allowed the continued existence of national
working requirements generally. It did not mention compulsory
licenses at all.iss
4.

The selection of national treatment

In addition to the principle of foreign priority, the Paris Convention also adopted the principle of national treatment. "The subjects or citizens of each of the contracting States shall enjoy, in all
other States of the Union, so far as concerns patents for inventions,
... the advantages that the respective laws thereof at present accord, or shall thereafter accord to subjects or citizens."'1 39 Stated
simply, national treatment requires each government to apply the
40
It
same provisions to both its own citizens and foreign nationals.
has been described, along with the principle of foreign priority, as a
4
fundamental tenet of the convention.' '
The Paris Union's agreement to provide for national treatment
stands in apparent opposition to the economic analysis suggested in
this article. At least in theory, national treatment prevents governments from employing the most effective tool for reducing the domestic cost of international patenting: expressly denying domestic
patent rights to foreign inventors.' 42 In addition, the Paris Union
consciously selected national treatment over the competing principle of reciprocity. 43 Under reciprocity, each government need
137. PLT, supra note 8, art. 5.
138. For discussions of the effect of this article in its initial form, see PENROSE, supra note 20, at 74-87.
139. PLT, supra note 8, art. 2. See generally Beier & Schricker, supra note 3,
at 83-87; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 64-67.
140. E.g., Beier & Schricker, supra note 3, at 83; PENROSE, supra note 20, at
64-65, Beier, supra note 21, at 9.
141. See, e.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 66; Beier, supra note 29, at 84;
ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 70; LADAS, supra note 20, at 265; VERNON, supra
note 91, at 2.
142. Although such provisions were no longer widespread by the 1870's, at
an earlier time it was apparently common for national governments to refuse
patents to foreigners outright. See LADAS, supra note 20, at 27. The United
States patent had such a provision in its laws from 1793 to 1836. See Moy, supra
note 17, at 789 n.42. Canada, as another example, had such a provision until the
early 1870's. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents, 1873, at
13-14.
National treatment also leads, by short extension, to the abolition of provisions that link the expiration of domestic and foreign patents. See generally
LADAS, supra note 20, at 505-07; PENROSE, supra note 20, at 71-74. Although not
in the Paris Convention originally, this prohibition appeared in the Washington
Revision of 1911. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 72.
143. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 64; Beier, supra note 21, at 8-10; LADAS,
supra note 20, at 269-70.
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award to foreign inventors only those patent rights that the foreign
inventor's own government awards to non-nationals. 4 4 Reciprocity
would thus seem a favorite of national governments: under it, the
cost of awarding domestic patents to foreigners is tied directly to
the benefits that domestic industry receives from patenting in for145
eign markets.
What, then, does the Paris Union's selection of national treatment imply? Does it invalidate the assertion that economic selfinterest explains the Paris Convention's substantive provisions?
More broadly, does it show the Paris Union to have adopted an internationalist, free-trade approach to foreign patenting?
When examined carefully, the adoption of national treatment
probably does not support these suppositions. Reasons completely
apart from a free-trade rationale can cause government to favor national treatment over reciprocity. A country applying reciprocity,
for example, must be expert in the patent laws of every foreign
1 46
country. Reciprocity thus risks large administrative costs.

In addition, a deeper examination shows that national treatment still permits government many forms of protectionist behavior in patenting. 147 Still possible, for example, are provisions that
are facially neutral with regard to nationality, but which impact
foriegners disproportionately. Working requirements and compulsory licenses are examples of two such provisions; 148 the restrictions in United States law against proof of invention by foreign
149
activities are another.
Another, more subtle type of protectionist provision permitted
under national treatment involves reducing the domestic costs of
patenting generally. The loss of domestic wealth to foreign patentees can occur only when domestic patenting results in valuable
144. E.g., Beier, supra note 21, at 8; Bogsch, supra note 21, at 196-97; William
EUR. INTELL. PROP. J. 99 (1980).
145. Elements in France, for example, objected to the use of national treatment in the convention. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 65-66. Various authors
assert that the United States has historically pressed for reciprocity with the
most vigor of any country in the Paris Union. Id. at 66; ANDERFELT, supra note
74, at 73 n.26; LADAS, supra note 20, at 270. The United States has recently
made reciprocity the basis of protection for foreign nationals in the Semi-Conductor Chip Protection Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a), 914.
146. E.g., MALcHUP, supra note 16, at 138; LADAS, supra note 20, at 269;
Bogsch, supra note 21, at 197; M. Osterag, InternationalUnionsfor the Protection of Literary,Industrial,and Artistic Property, 25 MICH. L. REV. 107, 110-11
(1926).
147. Indeed, national treatment appears to have been the norm in national
patent laws even prior to the Paris Convention. LADAS, supra note 20, at 27-28,
47-48.
148. See supra notes 96-100. Strict working requirements, in fact, can have
very nearly the same effect as refusing to grant patents to foreign inventors
altogether. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 111, n.2.
149. Moy, supra note 17, at 788.

R. Cornish, The Canker of Reciprocity, 10
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rights. Thus, government can reduce the outflow of wealth to foreigners by simply reducing the economic value of the domestic patent rights that are available. Indeed, the loss can be reduced to zero
by refusing to grant domestic patents altogether. 150
The Swiss patent system provides a historical example of a national government employing this latter technique. 15 ' Switzerland
progressed through the industrial revolution without a patent system. 1 2 The economic rationale behind this decision was sound:
without domestic patents Swiss consumers paid no increased prices
for new technology. Switzerland thus minimized the outflow of its
wealth to importers. Indeed, refusing to issue patents removed all
the social costs of patenting from the domestic Swiss economy. 153
At the same time, Switzerland continued to receive most of the benefits of patenting. True, Swiss industry could not expect patent
profits from introducing new technology into the domestic Swiss
economy. The absence of domestic patents, however, gave Swiss
industry free access to all the new technology that others developed. In addition, Swiss industry held patents in foreign countries,154 thus earning patent profits from exports and receiving an
incentive to invent in that way. In fact, because the the Swiss economy was small, the incentive that Swiss industry received from patented exports was arguably greater than the incentive that
dominating the domestic Swiss economy via patenting might have
supplied. 155
National treatment provided no obstacle to this strategy. The
original Paris Convention did not commit its members to provide
any minimum rights to patentees. 15 6 Thus Switzerland could, and
in fact did, adhere to the Paris Convention even though it had no
150. Cf. Bogsch, supra note 21, at 196-97. This can also be done selectively by
refusing to grant patents in particular technologies. Switzerland did so for a
time, for example, with regard to process technology. ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS 85-87 (1971); PENROSE, supra note 20, at
124. Modern examples include the exclusion of pharmaceuticals and food products from patentable subject matter in the patent laws of various countries. See
generally Gutterman, supra note 3, at 125-36.
151. There are at least several sources that discuss, in the English language,
the development of the Swiss patent system during the 1800's and early 1900's.
Schiff, supra note 150, at 85-126; Penrose, supra note 20, at 16-17, 120-24; Kaufer,
supra note 16, at 9-10, 48; Kronstein & Till, supra note 20, at 774-79.
152. See SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 85-95.
153. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 122.
154. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 121; SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 103-04. In
some countries, Swiss inventors "took out more patents per head of the domestic population than did inventors of any other nation." SCHIFF, supra note 150,
at 90.
155. Cf. ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 129-31; SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 100;
PENROSE, supra note 20, at 117-24 (discussing importance of foreign patenting to
countries with small domestic economies).
156. E.g., Beier, supra note 21, at 11.
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patent system whatsoever. 157 Its denial of patent rights equally to
domestic nationals and foreigners satisfied the requirement of national treatment. Additionally, adhering to the Paris Convention
guaranteed Swiss inventors national treatment from foreign governments, thereby ensuring Swiss industry access to patent profits
on its exports. 158 In fact, Switzerland did not find it in her interest
to enact a national patent system until Germany threatened her
159
with retaliatory tariff action.
C. MultilateralNegotiationsSubsequent to the Original
Paris Convention
Subsequent negotiations to revise the Paris Convention have
continued to follow this pattern. 160 It has been increasingly possible to harmonize the procedural requirements of patenting. 161 At
157.

PENROSE,

supra note 20, at 65. The Netherlands also adhered to the

Paris Convention without a national patent system. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra
note 74, at 71; Beier, supra note 21, at 10-11.
158. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 121.
159. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 16-17; Kronstein & Till, supra note 20, at
778-79. Recognizing the existence of this mechanism raises interesting questions about the current Japanese patent system. That system has been criticized as failing to provide meaningful rights, particularly to foreign inventors.
E.g., Hearing on the Effect of the JapanesePatent System on American Business Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,United States Senate, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 24, 1988); Hearingon Japanese PatentPolicy Before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(Feb. 28, 1989). The provisions of the Patent Harmonization Treaty that place
maximum time limits on examination, for example, Basic Proposal,art. 16, are
commonly regarded as being directed against the Japanese.
The current Japanese economy has several qualities that are similar to the
economy that apparently existed in Switzerland in the second half of the 1800's:
a relatively high degree of industrialization; a significant reliance on the export
of manufactured, and hence potentially patentable, goods; a propensity for obtaining patents in foreign countries; and an overall size that represents a small
domestic market in relation to the export market. See generally SCHIFF, supra
note 149, at 90-101. In addition, at least some segments of Swiss industry feared
that they were less innovative than foreign entities, and thus at risk of being
dominated by foreign-owned patent rights, an accusation that some United
States industrialists have leveled at Japan. E.g., Id. at 92; PENROSE, supra note
20, at 16, 123-24.
Japan may thus be benefiting from trade distortions that are the result of a
general absence of a domestic patent system, much as Switzerland did in the
late 1800's. See generally SCHIFF, supra note 150, at 101-06. For discussions of
the relationship between substantive Japanese patent law and Japan's national
trade interests, see Carter Mackley, The Role of the Patent System in Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 131
(1987); Guntram Rahn, The Role of IndustrialProperty in Economic Development: The JapaneseExperience, 14 IIC 449 (1983).
160. E.g., Beier, supra note 21, at 12 (asserting pattern of attempts to include
minimum standards in revisions to the Paris Convention).
161. See STRINGHAM, supra note 70, at 126-30. Article 4 of the convention,
for example, has expanded massively, and now treats numerous procedural
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the same time, agreement to limit the use of national patent provisions for protectionist purposes has not progressed very far. The
Paris Union has repeatedly revisited the issues of working requirements and compulsory licensing since 1883.162 The resulting provisions place very few restrictions on national governments that wish
to use these mechanisms. Compulsory licenses can be granted as
soon as three years after the patent issues. The patent can be revoked for failure to work two years thereafter. 16 3 Perhaps more
significant, even today the Paris Convention contains virtually no
requirements that national governments grant any other minmum
rights to patent holders.' 64 Indeed, the Convention still does not
even require that national governments enact patent systems at
all.165
This reluctance to forego protectionism has shown itself
outside the Paris Convention as well. The substantive standards in
Chapter II of the Patent Cooperation Treaty are expressly nonbinding; 16 6 the patent standards to be added to GATT are in sharp
dispute. 6 7 Even the one exception to this trend, the binding subcases in relatively minute detail. Stockholm Revision, arts 4-4 q-t r, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1629, 1631-36.
162. PENROSE, supra note 20, at 78-87; ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 72-92;
LADAS, supra note 20, at 68-89. Penrose describes these provisions as the "most
controversial" in the convention.
163. The relevant portions of article 5 now read:
A. - (1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the
Union shall not entail forfeiture.
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases
where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to
prevent the said abuses. No proceedings for forfeiture or revocation of a
patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant
of the first compulsory license.
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of
failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of
four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years
from the date of grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall
be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.
21 U.S.T. 1636-37.
164. See Beier, supra note 21, at 79, 96 (noting that the Paris Convention
does not call for the provision of sufficient national laws); Kirk, supra note 22,
at 601 (asserting that the Paris Convention provides for essentially no minimum
standards).
165. E.g., ANDERFELT, supra note 74, at 95, 114. Anderfelt suggests that
changes to article 17 during the Lisbon Revision of 1958 may obligate members
of the Paris Union to enact patent systems. Id. at 114. He admits that at least
one country did not adopt that interpretation.
166. PLT, supra note 8, art. 64(1).
167. See the authorities cited supra note 3.
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stantive standards in the EPC,l'8 is anomalous: the EPC exists only
among a small number of countries that are party to a broad, prior
commitment to internationalism amongst themselves. 16 9
III.

ANALYSIS

The nature of the Patent Harmonization Treaty becomes clear
when viewed in light of the foregoing history. Despite the practically continuous efforts of patent owners, the international community has never agreed to provide meaningful minimum standards of
patent protection to patentees. The treaty is another effort to obtain those standards. Included in it are virtually all the substantive
provisions that patent owners have sought historically and been
denied.
Additionally, the interest groups that are at odds over the
treaty remain essentially unchanged from prior harmonization efforts. International, patent-owning industry continues to seek
broad substantive rights in all countries. 170 Governments continue
to seek the freedom to impose national laws that favor domestic
171
development.
In short, the Patent Harmonization Treaty is simply the newest
vehicle in an ongoing debate. That debate existed long before the
treaty was proposed. It will likely continue long after the treaty is
either signed or abandoned.
A.

Evaluating the Patent Harmonization Treaty

This context suggests a number of analyses that might be useful in evaluating the Patent Harmonization Treaty. First, imple168. Arts. 52-74, reprintedin PATERSON, supra note 23, at 523-30. See Beier,
supra note 21, at 20.
169. Members of the European Economic Community, who roughly make up
the membership of the EPC, are signatory to the Treaty of Rome. See generally
May, supra note 17, at 808-09 nn.137-38.
170. The identity of the trade and industry groups that have appeared before
WIPO are listed in meeting notes referred to at supra note 7.
171. These differences can be seen in many of the disputes over specific provisions of the treaty. E.g., PLT, supra note 8, art. 10 (fields of technology); Id.
art. 19 (rights conferred by the patent); Id. art. 22 (patent term); Id. art. 25 (obligations of the patent owner); Id. art. 26 (remedial measures for violation of art.

25).
Perhaps the clearest indication is in the dispute over the preamble of the
treaty. The preamble is to be non-binding. Observations,supra note 41, at 5.
Nevertheless, the various parties to negotiations cannot agree whether the
Union "recogniz[es] the need to take into consideration the public policy objectives underlying national patent law," and is willing to "tak[e] into account development, technological, and public interest objectives" of its members. Basic
Proposal,PLT, supra note 8, at 4. The preamble is one of the provisions of the
treaty that the International Bureau has recommended deleting. See supra
note 41.
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menting the treaty will require the United States to change its
domestic patent laws. 172 As with all such proposed changes, we
must analyze their purely domestic effect. Amending the law to
change the rights of patent owners inevitably alters the balance between the social costs and benefits of patenting. We must therefore
discern whether the changes required by the Patent Harmonization
Treaty would improve the balance in the United States, or at least
not damage it unacceptably.
The debate over prior-user rights illustrates this point. Prioruser rights, in the form under consideration, except prior users of a
patented advance from the patent owner's control. 173 They currently do not exist in the United States. Introducing them would
necessarily reduce the profits that holders of United States patents
could expect from commercial exploitation of their patent rights.
174
This should directly reduce the incentive benefit of patenting.
At the same time, however, awarding rights to a prior user by
definition creates a multiple-supplier market for the patented technology. Prior-user rights are thus a specific form of compulsory
license. In general, they should drive the price of the patented technology down and decrease the social costs of patenting. From a
purely domestic viewpoint, therefore, evaluating prior-user rights
should involve calculating whether this decrease in social cost acceptably offsets the decrease in incentive benefit.
In addition to domestic considerations, however, evaluating the
Patent Harmonization Treaty will require us to analyze the treaty's
effect on the flow of wealth across our national borders. Strong
patent rights transfer increased amounts of wealth outside the
country to foreign patentees, while weak patent rights transfer
smaller amounts. Changing the economic rights of patent holders
in the United States will inevitably change the size of this transfer.
172. See Wilder, supra note 47.
173. Article 20, paragraph 1 of the proposed treaty reads as follows:

Not withstanding Article 19 ["Rights conferred by the Patent"], a patent shall have no effect against any person (hereinafter referred to as the
"prior user") who in good faith, for the purposes of his enterprise or business, before the filing date of where priority is claimed, the priority date of
the application on which the patent is granted, and within the territory
where the patent produces its effect, was using the inventionor was making
effective and serious preparations for such use; any such person shall have
the right, for the purposes of his enterprise or business, to continue such
use or to use the invention as envisaged in such preparations.
PLT, supra note 8, at 41.
174. Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate

Committees on the Judiciary,102d Cong., 2d Sess. (statement of Douglas Wyatt)
(Apr. 30, 1992).
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Prior-user rights again provide an illustration. The treaty calls
for prior-user rights to be awarded only to prior users who are active domestically.175 Such rights would thus remove wealth from
patent owners, a class of persons in which foreign nationals can be
numerically commonplace, and transfer it to domestic industry and
consumers. Prior-user rights therefore protect domestic wealth
from the incursions of foreign patentees. 176 The interest in minimizing outflow of the nation's wealth to foreigners argues for their
introduction even apart from purely domestic concerns.
As a still further issue the wealth-transfer effect of foreign patents suggests in fact that the United States examine carefully the
basic assumption that increased patent harmonization is in the national interest. At least three major variables affect the losses that
a country will suffer from foreign patenting: the size of the country's economy; the strength of the rights that the country's patent
laws give to patentees; and the overall number of patents that the
country grants to patentees who are foreign. The United States
does not appear to fare well by any of these criteria. Its economy
represents 30% of the world's consumption - by far the largest
economy of any single country in the world. At the same time,
United States patent laws provide patent owners with some of the
strongest patent rights in existence. 177 The United States currently
grants 45% of its patents to foreigners, the highest percentage at
178
any time in its history.
Taken together, these factors virtually assure that open international patenting will inflict a substantial loss of economic wealth
175. The Patent Harmonization Treaty calls for prior-users rights based
upon use "within the territory where the patent produces its effect." PLT,
supra note 8, art. 20(1). The legislation previously before Congress would have
granted prior-user rights only to those whose use was "in the United States."
E.g., S. 2605, § 3(b) (proposing new 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)). This national focus corresponds to nearly identical provisions in the national laws of other countries.
E.g., Beier, supra note 29, at 14, 17.
176. Article 4 of the Paris Convention, in fact, has always permitted the
award of prior user rights by making the right of foreign priority "subject to the
rights of third parties." E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 68 n.18.
177. E.g., PENROSE, supra note 20, at 1 n.1; LADAS, supra note 20, at 270. But
see VERNON, supra note 91, at 4 (asserting antitrust limitations on patenting in
United States to exceed those in foreign countries). The law of antitrust in the
United States is less extensive today than 1957, the date of Vernon's writing.
178. USPTO, Patents Issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE NEWS RELEASE No. 92-1 (Feb. 14, 1992). The latest statistics are expected to show a very slight decline in this percentage.
This percentage has increased drastically in the relatively recent past. At
the turn of the century, less that 10% of United States patents were being
granted to foreign nationals. COMM'R PATS. ANN REP. 1970, 11, 26. The percentage was below 20% throughout most of the 1960's. Id Thus foreign patenting
can be said to inflict much greater damage on the United States economy today
than in earlier times. See generally VERNON, supra note 91, at 4; Greer, supra
note 134, at 228-30.
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on the United States. They suggest, in fact, that the United States
may well suffer the largest such losses of any country in the
world.179
Put plainly, then, there are substantial reasons why the United
States might lose, rather than gain, from a general increase in the
amount of international patenting. The national interest may thus
favor resisting patent harmonization. At the very least, we should
submit to patent harmonization only. after comparing carefully
what we will gain with what we will lose.
B. Evaluating Industry's Advice
Historical context also suggests how to evaluate industry's enthusiasm for the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Industry's enthusiasm should be suspect to the extent that it is the result of industry's
own peculiar subset of interests in patenting. In particular, history
and reason suggest that we should carefully examine whether industry has considered the social costs that increased international
patenting will impose domestically. If industry's calculus excludes
those costs its advice is not sound.
A concrete example will illustrate how this evaluation might
operate. The Patent Harmonization Treaty has been described,
from the viewpoint of the United States, as a bargained-for exchange. The United States is offering to change its theory of priority from the current rationale of first-to-invent to the rationale of
first-to-file. In return, the European Community will provide in1 80
ventors a grace period prior to filing.
Industry's endorsement of this bargain is understandable. A
grace period would be more hospitable to inventors than Europe's
179. The reevaluation suggested in the text may find historical precedent in
the changing negotiating position of England, which went from supporting open
international patenting strongly in the 1880's to advocating more protectionist
agreements in the early 1900's. Anderfelt suggests that this change was driven
by the rest of the industrialized world reaching rough parity with England's
development at the end of the Industrial revolution. ANDERFELT, supra note
74. See also PENROSE, supra note 20, at 140-41.
It is important to note that deemphasizing multilateral patent harmonization as a goal does not mean abandoning efforts to improve the rights of United
States patentees in foreign countries. Bilateral mechanisms, such as actions
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1930, codified as amended in 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1301, 1303, are available to change the behavior of the United States' trading
partners. See generally DUVALL, supra note 3, at 591-93. Generally speaking,
use of these mechanisms would require the United States to offer fewer commitments to change its own patent laws in return for concessions from foreign
governments.
180. E.g. Fiorito, supra note 5, at 88-89; Pagenberg, supra note 5, at 2, 7; Manbeck statement, supra note 63.
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current rule of absolute novelty.' 81 Marginally more European patents would issue to inventors under such a rule, thereby increasing
somewhat the overall expectation within United States industry of
82
profit from patenting in Europe.
At the same time, offering to adopt first-to-file priority will impose increased costs on the United States. The United States' firstto-invent provisions effectively discriminate against foreign inventors in the race to obtain United States patents. 183 Because few
other provisions in United States patent law have this effect,184
first-to-invent priority may well be the major means by which the
United States protects itself against the outflow of its wealth to foreign patentees. 8 5 Changing to first-to-file priority will thus increase the outflow of wealth from the United States, perhaps
significantly.
Industry's enthusiasm for the basic bargain of the Patent Harmonization Treaty must therefore be viewed skeptically. Exchanging a European grace period for first-to-file may provide the United
States economy with a net gain. Industry, however, will not bear
most of the costs that increased foreign patenting will inflict on the
United States. Industry would probably support the treaty even if
its operation would provide society with a clear net loss.
Historical context also raises other issues. If the interests of
industry and the nation are in fact different, adherence to proper
181. Inventors who make public disclosures during the grace period will obtain patents that would not be granted otherwise.
182. Of course, this increase will apply to European inventors as well. The
fact that European patenting interests also favor the use of a grace period is
therefore not surprising. See supra note 30.
183. Moy, supra note 17, at 784-88.
184. United States patent law does not contain, for example, a working requirement, compulsory licensing or prior user rights. It contains no selective
exclusion of technological fields from patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. United States procedures for granting patents, moreover, operate with
essentially equal efficiency on applications filed by nationals and foreigners.
Thus, while the United States' first-to-invent provisions are less than perfectly
internationalist, United States patent law as a whole is probably no more protectionist than that of foreign patent systems. See, e.g., Section 24, German Patent Act of 1980, reprintedin Beier, supra note 21, at 22 (setting out compulsory
licensing and working requirements); Societa Italiana Brevetti, Bulletin on Patents and Trademarks in Italy, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 484 (1992)
(discussing compulsory licensing and working requirements in various European countries); Frederick M. Ritchie, So You Want a Commercially Important
Patent in Japan!, 74 J.P.T.O.S. 186 (1992). The sources on Japanese patent
practices cited supra note 158. Indeed, it may be considerably less so.
185. The protectionist effects of the United States' first-to-file provisions
have been noted by foreign interests during the WIPO negotiations. See, e.g.,
International Federation of Industrial Property Counsel, FICPIPosition Paper
for the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing
the ParisConvention as Faras PatentsAre Concerned (PatentLaw Harmonization Treaty), at 1-2 (May 6, 1991) (discussing result as "bias in favor of residents
of the U.S.").
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lawmaking processes becomes critical. Whether the treaty reflects
the overall will of the United States, for example, should depend
heavily on whether the various constituencies have been represented adequately. Yet, from the record it appears that industry
has had a disproportionate role in defining the treaty before WIPO.
Nearly all of the nongovernmental participants in the WIPO negotiations have been from industrial and related interests.1l s One author has even suggested that industrial interests should control the
8 7
debate within WIPO over patent harmonization.
Industry's narrow interests, in fact, may have already influenced how the United States is approaching international patenting
generally. The Federal government has relied on several advisory
committees in this area18 8 - advisory committees whose memberships have been drawn heavily from patent-owning industry.8 9
The government's recent statements of policy reflect precisely the
limited outlook that one would expect of industry.19° Much attention has been paid to the increased revenues that industry could
expect from stronger intellectual property rights abroad.' 9 ' In contrast, little or no attention has been paid to the costs that any concessions will impose on the United States. Indeed, many of the
documents prepared by the government and its advisory committees do not reveal an awareness that increased international patenting will inflict any domestic costs. Observers can therefore wonder
whether the flaws of the Patent Harmonization Treaty exist in
186. See Moy, supra note 17, at 793-803.
187. Beier, supra note 21, at 18.
188. The advisory committees that have addressed international patenting
issues since 1980 include the Advisory Commission of Patent Law Reform to
the Secretary of Commerce, see A Report to the Secretary of Commerce (1992),
the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights
for Trade Policy Matters to the Secretary of Commerce (IFAC 3) and the Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property to the Secretary of
State.
189. For example, of the twenty-five members and alternate members of the

Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, twenty were either employees of
large patent-owning entities or private patent lawyers. Similarly, at least 31 of
the 38 members of IFAC 3 were closely aligned with patent-owning industry.

190. See, e.g., Administration Statement on International Trade Policy, Sept.
23, 1985; US. Trade Representative,Oversight Hearingon Intellectual Property

and Trade Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administrationof Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary,101st Cong., 1st

Sess. 27-61 (1989) (testimony of Carla Hills).
191. Those efforts have included attempts to obtain greater protection, see
Administration Statement on the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Rights Abroad, (Apr. 3, 1986); Statement by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm

Baldridge on Proposed "Intellectual Property Rights Improvement Act of
1986," (Apr. 7, 1986); Statement by Ambassador Clayton Yeutter Concerning
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, (Apr. 7, 1986), as well as efforts to document the amount of the potential gains. E.g., Foreign Intellectual Property
Protection and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 2065
(1988).
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other international agreements that have been negotiated recently,
such as NAFTA and the TRIPs portion of GATT.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Patent Harmonization Treaty is one of the most recent
events in a historical series of international negotiations relating to
patenting. In those negotiations, patent owners have sought to increase their rights generally. National governments, in contrast,
have tended to seek arrangements that provide net gains to their
individual economies. Typically these objectives have been in opposition. As a result, international patenting agreements have not
progressed very far, despite efforts that have now spanned more
than a century.
One can wonder whether the United States has been aware of
this history in negotiating the Patent Harmonization Treaty. With
regard to substantive, as opposed to procedural patent provisions,
precious little of what occurred in the negotiations to date has been
an altruistic exercise in international cooperation. Rather, the various parties have consistently sought terms of agreement that further their own self-interests. Certainly this has been true of the
national governments; it has been equally true of private industry.
Knowing this, one would expect the United States to have carefully measured the cost of each concession it has offered. Yet, this
does not appear to be the case. No significant study appears to have
preceded, for example, either the United States' offer to switch to
first-to-file priority or its later, more limited offer of
192
compromise.
More fundamentally, given the self-interested behavior of the
parties one would expect the United States to have demanded high
quality, representative input into the negotiations. Yet this may not
have happened either. Patent-owning industry has had a large role
in defining the United States's position on the Patent Harmonization Treaty. Whether that industry has acted in the national interest, rather than its own, is questionable. In any event, domestic
United States industry appears to grasp the implications of international patenting much less well than do foreign interests in the
WIPO negotiations.
192. See infra note 6.

